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Prosecuting Cartels Without Direct Evidence Of Agreement


In all countries, indices are used in cartel cases. The best practice is to use the indices holistically and give it a cumulative effect rather than on an article-by-point basis. What complicates matters is that the use of indices in national competition legislation defines differently the type of agreements that are legislated. There are two types of general clues: evidence of communication and economic evidence. Both consider communication to be the most important. Economic evidence is almost always ambiguous. It could be compatible either with an agreement or with independent measures. In-depth analysis is therefore necessary. The national treatment of cartels, y.

B whether they are prosecuted as criminal offences or as administrative offences, may impair the burden of proof of cases and, therefore, the use of evidence. It can be difficult to convince the courts to accept evidence of cartels and abuse of dominance, particularly when potential liability for breaches of cartel rules and abuse of dominance in competition law is high. There are situations in relatively new countries in the implementation of the fight against cartels that could influence the extent to which they rely on clues in their cases. This review builds on the best of recent work for and by the OECD Competition Committee and Policy. Its articles provide an overview of the thinking of a competition advocate and focus on the practical application of competition law and competition policy. Robert Pitofsky, Chairman of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, told the new journal when it was created: “Global competition is the wave of the future and a comparative analysis of the laws and practices of different members of the global community of nations is a necessary consequence. This new OECD journal on competition law and competition policy, developed from the DISCUSSIONs of the OECD roundtable, summarises of the latest developments and articles on topics of particular interest, will allow regulators, practitioners and scientists to become familiar with different regulatory approaches around the world and will allow us to better take into account the strengths and weaknesses of our own systems. Persistent Link: Related Works:This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export Reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Downloads: (external link) (text/html) Full text for online playback. PDF download available to OECD iLibrary subscribers. Date: References 2009: Added references to CitEc Citations: Track citations by RSS feed JOURNAL: Competition Law and Policy, 2009, vol. 9, issue 3, 49-105 Other articles from the OECD journal: Competition Law and Policy from OECD Publishing Information at EDIRC. Bibliographical data for ().

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